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Can Branded Drugs Benefit from Generic Entry? The Role of Detailing 
and Price in Switching to Non-Bioequivalent Molecules 
 
Abstract 
Patent expiration represents a turning point not only for the brand losing patent protection, as 
bioequivalent generic versions of the drug quickly enter the market at reduced prices, but also for the non-
bioequivalent drugs that retain patent protection in the same therapeutic category. In this paper, we study 
how physician characteristics and prescribing decisions impact competition among molecules of a 
therapeutic class once generic versions of one of these molecules enter the market. Our results show that 
the traditional focus on the single molecule losing patent protection is not sufficient to understand the 
impact of generics in the category and their cost-saving potential. We find that generic entry in the 
category under analysis not only leads to the expected decrease in the prescription of the branded 
molecule bioequivalent to the generics, but also unexpectedly benefits other non-bioequivalent branded 
drugs as detailing-sensitive physicians switched from the contested molecule to these other branded 
alternatives. However, a group of price-sensitive physicians did increase their use of the new generics to 
the detriment of all branded alternatives, allowing for additional savings in health care costs. The overall 
market result is a slight decrease in the prescriptions of the now much cheaper molecule. This paradox 
was identified previously in several pharmaceutical categories (Caves et al., 1992), but lacked a 
systematic understanding and explanation. We show that the understanding of such market paradoxes 
requires marketers and policy makers to (1) determine the size of physician segments sensitive to 
marketing activity and prices, and (2) assess the marketing activity of all pharmaceutical firms, whether 
bioequivalent or not. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of our results. 
Key words: Generic entry, Pharmaceuticals, Heterogeneity, Competition 
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1. Introduction 
With a significant number of major blockbuster molecules no longer protected by patents or nearing 
patent expiration, drug companies have demonstrated an increased interest in studying generic drug 
competition and its market penetration. For example, over the next five to ten years about US$40 
billion of prescription revenue is expected to be affected by patent expiration and consequent generic 
entry (Van Arnum, 2004). Drug companies are not the only market agents interested in better 
understanding the substitution patterns between generic versus branded versions of a molecule. Rising 
health care costs have become a major public concern in recent years.  
 Prescription drugs represent a significant component of such costs, with shares ranging from 
four percent in the United States (US) to nearly 18 percent in France and Italy (Kyle, 2003). As a 
result, one of the avenues pursued by public health officials to reduce health-related expenditures has 
been to foster the substitution of branded molecules with lower priced generic versions (Gleckman, 
2002). The benefits from such substitution can be substantial. For example, Fischer & Avorn (2003) 
analyze state-by-state Medicaid prescription drug spending in the US for the year 2000 and find that 
states would have saved US$229 million with a greater use of generic drugs. Total savings would 
have reached US$450 million if the best available prices from each state had been used nationally. 
The interest of both drug companies and public health officials has spurred significant research 
efforts in the area of generic drug competition and adoption. A significant portion of this recent literature 
has focused on the institutional factors and supply side issues that affect generic demand (e.g., Caves, 
Whinston & Hurwitz 1992; Scott-Morton, 1999, 2000 and 2002; Danzon & Chao 2000) and on the 
aggregate effects of generic entry on the branded drug losing patent protection (e.g., Frank & Salkever, 
1992 and 1997; Magazzini, Pammolli, Riccaboni & Magazzini, 2004; Lexchin, 2004). The role of 
physicians in the demand for generics and in generic competition has received far less attention (e.g., 
Hellerstein, 1998), though a critical feature of prescription pharmaceuticals is that the end consumer, the 
patient, does not select the drug she will consume. Instead, the physician decides the drug therapy and, in 
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most western countries, whether the patient will receive a branded drug or its generic alternative once 
generics become available in the market.  
Using unique panel data that tracks physicians’ prescription behavior before and after entry of a 
generic drug, we study how physician characteristics (observable and unobservable) and their prescribing 
decisions impact the competition among molecules of a therapeutic class once generic versions of one of 
these molecules enter the market. Specifically, we study the evolution of the Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), a subcategory of antidepressants, after the introduction of generic versions 
of fluoxetine (brand name Prozac) in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Unlike previous research, we simultaneously analyze the competition between the entering generics 
and the brand that faces patent expiration (within-molecule competition) and the competition among all of 
the molecules in the therapeutic class (between-molecule competition). In the analysis, we control for the 
marketing activity targeted to physicians, which had been mostly ignored by previous research on generic 
diffusion. In addition, we compare the behavior of physicians before and after patent expiration. This 
allows us to study how physician characteristics measured before patent expiration (e.g., drug preference, 
sensitivity to marketing activity, and sensitivity to prices) are predictive of the market evolution of 
generics, of the brand facing patent expiration, and of the remaining brands in the therapeutic class. 
Our findings are of interest for both managers and policy makers. For example, in this empirical 
application we find that the market share of the molecule losing patent protection (also called the multi-
source molecule because of its availability under branded and generic versions) decreased after patent 
expiration, a pattern that is not uncommon (see Caves et al., 1992). This reduction occurred despite the 
availability of generics (whose bioequivalence is verified by the government) at significant price 
discounts and despite the more favorable price differential for the multi-source molecule versus the 
remaining drugs in the category. We argue that this is due to a significant reduction of marketing support 
by the brand losing patent protection in anticipation of significant free-riding from generics. As a result, 
physicians sensitive to marketing activities switch from the multi-source molecule to other (branded) non-
bioequivalent molecules, as these increase their marketing support. A smaller segment of price-sensitive 
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physicians who increase prescribing of the multi-source molecule is unable to fully compensate for the 
behavior of physicians who are sensitive to marketing activities like detailing.  
These results suggest that to fully understand the market impact of generic drug entry and its 
subsequent adoption, it is essential to (1) study the full competitive market dynamics (both within- and 
between-molecule competition), (2) account for the marketing activity of pharmaceutical companies and 
determine how physicians respond to marketing actions and drug prices at the individual level, and (3) 
investigate the prescription habits of physicians even before drugs lose patent protection. 
Our findings also suggest that the design of proper incentive schemes by companies and 
governments should carefully consider the responsiveness of physicians to prices and to marketing 
activity, the sizes of the different physician segments, and the likely competitive responses of all players 
in the market (e.g., in this case, non-bioequivalent competitors had little reason to fear generic entry, and 
deep price cuts would have not been warranted). Even if very detailed information is not available for all 
physicians, companies and governments could determine which physicians to target using observable 
physician characteristics. In this data set, for example, women prescribe generics more often than men, 
and physicians working in larger practices prescribe more generics than those in smaller practices. 
This paper is organized as follows. Next, we present the literature review and the findings relevant 
to this work. Then we describe the adopted methodology, present the data used, and provide more 
information on the empirical application setting and estimation issues. Finally, we present the results and 
elaborate on their implications for policy makers and drug companies. We then conclude with limitations 
and areas for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of generic consumption has created a fertile ground for research on generic drug 
competition and adoption. These studies rely mostly on aggregated data and rarely consider individual 
physicians’ influence. 
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2.1 Aggregate Level Studies 
A significant portion of the recent literature on generics has focused on the effects of institutional 
and supply side factors. Such work comprises the analysis of topics such as: the effect of regulation on 
competition (Danzon & Chao, 2000; Aronsson, Bergman & Rudholm, 2001; Kyle, 2003), the role of 
buying system characteristics such as insurance and Medicaid coverage (Jayachandran, Nevins & 
Bearden, 2003), advertising and licensing as entry deterrents (Grabowski & Vernon, 1992; Scott-Morton, 
2000; Königbauer, 2005), the integrated production of generics and branded drugs (Ferrándiz, 1999; 
Scott-Morton, 2002), and factors influencing generic entry (Bae, 1997; Scott-Morton, 1999 and 2000). 
Another significant stream of research investigates the dynamics of market shares, quantity sold, 
and prices after generic entry (e.g., Hurwitz & Caves, 1988; Caves et al., 1992; Frank & Salkever, 1992 
and 1997; Aronsson et al., 2001; Reiffen & Ward, 2003; Lexchin, 2004; Magazzini et al., 2004). Results 
have not always been in agreement, often depending on the data and methodology employed, though 
several important conclusions can be made. For example, most studies report a significant decrease in 
market share of the original brand after patent expiration, with major brand names in recent years 
typically losing half of their market share within one year of patent expiration (e.g., Grabowski & Vernon, 
1996). In contrast, prices of original brands increase (e.g., Grabowski & Vernon, 1992; Frank & Salkever, 
1997) or remain mostly unchanged (e.g., Caves et al., 1992; Lexchin, 2004), though the net effect is an 
average price reduction for the molecule, branded and generic alternatives combined (Frank & Salkever, 
1997).  
2.2 Physician Role 
With few exceptions, the role of physicians' characteristics and physician decision-making is often 
ignored, despite the central role that physicians play in prescription drug markets. Recently, the few 
studies that analyze physician-level prescribing data have shed some light on the influence of physicians 
on generic adoption. Hellerstein (1998) uses US physician prescription data to examine physicians’ 
choice of drug version (branded vs. generic) for molecules whose patents had recently expired. She 
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concludes that some physicians are significantly more likely to prescribe generics whereas others are 
more likely to prescribe brands (though almost all physicians prescribe both versions), and that physicians 
are indeed important agents in shaping the fate of generics. Two other studies on physicians’ role in 
generic prescribing, Coscelli (2000) and Lundin (2000), draw similar conclusions. Mainly, these studies 
show that physician habit has a significant influence on generic versus brand-name choices. 
Though these recent studies provide important insights regarding the role of physicians in shaping 
within-molecule competition, several questions remain unanswered. First, competition in pharmaceuticals 
exists both within a molecule (branded vs. generic, prescription vs. over-the-counter) and between 
different molecules that treat the same condition. Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000), and Lundin (2000) 
neither incorporate nor study the competition among non-bioequivalent drugs in the same therapeutic 
class (between-molecule competition), despite previous studies showing the importance of intermolecular 
competition. For example, Stern (1996) shows that cross-price elasticities between branded and generic 
versions of a molecule are low and that the cross-price elasticities between therapeutic substitutes are 
high. Lichtenberg and Philipson (2000) find also that the loss in sales due to the entry of new drugs into 
the therapeutic class reduces the value of a drug considerably more than the entry of bioequivalent 
generics. 
Second, the works of Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000), and Lundin (2000) have not incorporated 
pharmaceutical marketing and individual physicians’ responses to marketing actions. Marketing actions 
have a real impact on physician prescribing (e.g., Gönül, Carter, Petrova & Srinivasan, 2001; Wittink, 
2002; Venkataraman & Stremersch, 2007) and constitute a major competitive force by which firms strive 
to differentiate their products and soften price competition. Pharmaceutical firms invest heavily in product 
promotion, spending as much on marketing as they do on research and development (promotion-to-sales 
ratios are among the highest of all manufactured goods; Hurwitz & Caves, 1988). Prior studies have also 
shown that physicians differ in their drug preferences and in their responsiveness to marketing activities 
and prices (e.g., Venkataraman & Stremersch, 2007), making it essential to incorporate physician 
heterogeneity in studying generic adoption. Incorporating individual level heterogeneity is also important 
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from the perspective of brand and generic managers, as the brand losing patent protection tends to 
significantly reduce its marketing effort, and generic versions do not invest in goodwill building activities 
(Caves et al., 1992).This structural change is likely to alter the incentives of some physicians and 
transform the competitive landscape.  
In this study we investigate how physician characteristics (observable and unobservable) and 
physician prescribing decisions impact the competition among all molecules of a therapeutic class (e.g., 
SSRIs, a subcategory of antidepressants) once generic versions of one of these molecules (e.g., 
fluoxetine) enter the market. In our analysis, and unlike previous research, we will study both within- and 
between-molecule competition and account for drug price changes. In addition, we control for 
pharmaceutical marketing activity, physician heterogeneity in response, and drug similarity due to 
bioequivalence. Next, we will present the modeling approach and describe the setting of the empirical 
application. 
3. Modeling Approach 
We adopt a two-step approach to investigate how both physician characteristics and prescribing decisions 
impact the competition among molecules of a therapeutic class once generic versions of one of these 
molecules enter the market. In the first phase, we study physician prescribing behavior to characterize 
physicians in terms of unobservable characteristics like brand and drug preference, responsiveness to 
marketing activity, and price sensitivity. In the second phase, we study drug prescribing after the initial 
market settling period and model the prescribing of the molecule losing patent expiration versus (1) all 
other drugs in the therapeutic category (between-molecule competition) and (2) the generic competitors 
(within-molecule competition). For the second phase, we use as covariates the estimates from the first 
phase and test whether the levels of physician detailing sensitivity and other unobservable physician 
characteristics allow a better understanding of physician prescribing after patent expiration. 
3.1 Phase 1: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Model 
In the first phase, we adopt a multinomial logit to model physician drug choice decisions for each 
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patient visit, given a prescription in the focal therapeutic category. We allow all parameters (e.g., 
underlying preferences and responsiveness to marketing activity and prices) to be physician-specific via a 
random effects formulation. We then use the individual parameters to characterize each physician. The 
model is estimated using Bayesian simulation methods (in Appendix A we present the full model 
specification, and in Appendix B we show the estimation details). 
 We believe that the proposed random effects multinomial logit approach is the most appropriate 
to characterize physicians with respect to their unobserved characteristics. First, multinomial logit models 
are well known, robust, and widely used to study choice behavior when full competitive information is 
available. Previous applications include the analysis of pharmaceuticals (e.g., Janakiraman, Sismeiro & 
Dutta, 2008; Narayanan & Manchanda, 2007; Liu, Gupta, & Venkataraman 2007; Gönül et al., 2001), 
transportation mode (e.g., Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985), and packaged goods (e.g., Bucklin & Gupta, 
1992). Prior studies of drug performance (Jayachandran et al., 2003) also suggest that the entry of generic 
pharmaceuticals does not lead to appreciable market expansion, and the data used for this study also 
support this contention (as can be seen from Figure 1, there has been no market growth in the period 
under analysis). As a result, we can account for the full competitive actions when modeling drug choice 
conditional on a prescription using a multinomial choice model. Finally, previous studies of 
pharmaceuticals have shown that, at a given patient visit, physicians are influenced by their own previous 
prescription choices (e.g., Janakiraman, Dutta, Sismeiro & Stern, 2008). As a result, by modeling the 
prescription decision for each individual patient, we can account for these carryover effects. 
 We note, however, that in the current modeling approach we are not accounting for possible 
endogeneity and non-randomness of marketing variables, which might pose a significant problem in the 
first-phase estimation. To limit the impact of these factors, we note that we have included the effect of 
previous physician choices, allowed for physician-specific preferences for each one of the drugs (all 
parameters are indeed physician-specific), and incorporated the marketing activity of all competing drugs 
in the choice models estimated. In addition, we further note that during the time-frame under analysis, the 
firms in question were not using sophisticated individual-level modeling to determine responsive and 
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non-responsive physicians and did not use such sophisticated input to inform physician targeting 
(targeting based on physician responsiveness is the typical reason pointed to by researchers for the 
presence of endogeneity in their data). Finally, and interestingly, in our dataset we find little evidence of 
the use of volumetric-based strategies to target physicians, and we find no evidence that women are 
targeted differently from men.2 
To estimate the first phase model, we will observe physicians for a significant period before 
generic entry. We will denote this period as Period 1. By constraining the multinomial logit analysis to a 
significant period before patent expiration, we can reliably measure physician characteristics and avoid 
potential problems of non-stability of individual physician parameters (after generics enter the market, a 
significant change in market structure occurs; this change could lead to shifts in physician preference and 
responsiveness to marketing variables).  
3.2 Phase 2: Binomial Models 
In the second phase of the analysis, we study drug prescribing after patent expiration and generic 
entry. We will denote this time period as Period 2 (the same physicians are tracked in Periods 1 and 2, and 
all physicians are also used in the second phase estimation). Using the data in Period 2, we model (1) the 
prescribing of the molecule losing patent protection, generic and branded versions combined, versus all 
other drugs in the therapeutic category (between-molecule competition) and (2) the prescribing of the 
brand losing patent protection versus its generic competitors (within-molecule competition). In these 
between- and within-molecule competition analyses, we will study whether observable (e.g., gender and 
practice size) and unobservable (e.g., responsiveness to marketing actions and price) physician 
characteristics can predict the market evolution after generic entry. To measure the unobservable 
physician characteristics, we will use the physician parameters obtained in the first modeling phase (using 
                                                 
2 To test for volumetric-based strategies in the targeting of detailing meetings, we have sorted physicians based on their total 
SSRI prescription volume and classified them into quintiles. We then determined the average detailing per physician in each 
quintile and tested for differences across quintiles. Our results show that detailing does not differ significantly across the five 
groups, except for the fourth quintile (the second lowest prescribing group). For the fifth quintile (physicians prescribing the 
lowest number of antidepressants) and all other quintiles, we found no significant differences in detailing intensity. We also 
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the random effects multinomial logit model).3 
To study prescriptions of the molecule losing patent expiry versus all other drugs in the therapeutic 
category (between-molecule competition), we estimate a binomial model (details in Appendix A). We 
assume that, after patent expiration, for physician i and across all ni prescriptions in the category, the 
probability of prescribing the multi-source molecule irrespective of its form (pi) is a function of (1) 
physician-specific unobservable (estimated in the first phase) and observable characteristics, and (2) a 
prescription baseline. Hence, the prescription probability is then given by: 
 
 

ii
ii
i Zs
Zsp 

exp1
exp
,  (1) 
 
where Zi is a (1×q) vector of physician characteristics (observable and unobservable),  is the (q×1) 
vector of parameters,  represents the model intercept, and si is the prescription baseline.  
 We estimate two alternative model formulations that correspond to two alternative baselines. One 
model formulation will allow the study of prescribing changes from Period 1 to Period 2. To do so, we set 
as prescription baseline the logit transformation of the prescription share of the multi-source drug for each 
physician, that is, si = log(SHAREi / (1-SHAREi)), where SHAREi is the prescription share for the multi-
source molecule (vs. all molecules of the category) during Period 1 (we call this Model I; see Table 1). 
The interpretation is straightforward (assume for simplicity that  = 0): if the observable and 
unobservable physician characteristics are not predictive of prescribing changes from Period 1 to Period 
2, then the   will not be significantly different from zero, and the best model will set the probability of 
prescribing the molecule equal to the previous prescribing share for that physician (pi = SHAREi); 
otherwise,   will be significantly different from zero and it will shift the prescription probability of each 
                                                                                                                                                             
tested whether female physicians were targeted differently from male physicians, and again, we found no significant difference in 
detailing intensity. Full results are available from the authors upon request. 
3 In the binomial models, we use as covariates the estimates of unobservable characteristics obtained from the multinomial logit. 
Such estimates include sampling error and might not be statistically significant. To handle these additional estimation errors, we 
will test the significance of each individual level parameter (and consider only those significantly different from zero), and we 
will use a bootstrap procedure to assess the robustness of our estimates. We also used an alternative procedure in which we 
integrated the binomial model results over the Bayesian simulation draws. We present the details of these procedures in the 
results section. 
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physician away from her own previous prescribing share. 
 The second model formulation will allow the study of how physicians split their prescribing into 
the different drug alternatives in Period 2. In this case, we set to zero the prescribing baseline (si = 0; we 
call this Model II) and are able to study how different physicians prescribe the drug after patent expiry. 
We adopt similar model formulations to study within-molecule competition. In this case, the variables of 
the binomial likelihood will correspond to branded prescriptions of Period 2 versus total multi-source 
prescriptions of Period 2. Both baseline formulations are possible for the within-molecule binomial 
model, and these models are called Model III and Model IV (see Table 1 for a summary). 
4. Data 
We use a dataset on physician prescribing behavior and competitive marketing activity from a continuous 
panel of General Practitioners (GP) in the UK, tracked from September 1998 to September 2000. The 
category of prescriptions tracked are those of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), a 
subcategory of antidepressants, and the time-period under analysis covers the patent expiration of 
fluoxetine (brand name Prozac), which occurred in January 2000.  
4.1 The Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors Category in the UK 
Fluoxetine Hydrochloride was the first SSRI, marketed worldwide under the name of Prozac. It 
was launched in 1988 and quickly became a success. Proclaimed as a wonder drug, it benefited from 
unprecedented media attention, the marketing efforts of Eli-Lilly (its manufacturer), milder side effects, 
and the novel benefit of non-lethal overdoses. This success led to introduction of more SSRIs during the 
1990s: Seroxat (Glaxo-Smithkline-Beecham) and Lustral (Pfizer), both introduced in 1991, and Cipramil 
(Lundbeck), introduced in 1995.4 In January 2000, the last patent held by Eli-Lilly in the UK on its 
blockbuster drug ended, and 14 companies launched generic versions of fluoxetine. At the end of 2000, 
generic versions of fluoxetine had overcome Prozac in unit sales, and the amount of money paid by the 
UK National Health System for Prozac 20mg (the most common format) plunged from £88.1 million in 
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1999 to £61 million in 2000. In 2000, the average prescription price for Prozac was £26.12, whereas 
generic versions were priced at £15.29 (Department of Health UK, 2002). 
The UK market development after the entry of generic fluoxetine is similar to those in other 
markets and pharmaceutical categories: the original brand tends to lose market share rapidly because 
generics are offered at deep discount, but the molecule as a whole does not necessarily grow. This makes 
the example of Prozac/fluoxetine in the UK an ideal case to study. In addition, the specific features of the 
UK market are also especially appealing for this study. First, direct to consumer advertising of 
prescription drugs is not allowed in the UK, and drugs can only be advertised in medical journals. Also, 
medical insurance and the actions of Health Management Organizations (Gönül et al., 2001) do not play a 
significant role in the UK due to the ubiquity of the National Health Service (NHS). Patients pay a flat 
rate for prescription drugs regardless of the cost of the drug (e.g., in 2004, UK patients paid £5.25 per 
prescription, which covered 40% of the average prescription cost). Thus, patients tend to exert a weak 
influence on physician prescription decisions due to weak cost-related incentives and lack of information. 
Furthermore, in the UK, prices of drugs under patent are the outcome of negotiations between 
pharmaceutical companies and the NHS, translating into small price variations across drugs and for each 
drug across time. For example, in this sample there was only one significant price change across all 
brands during the two-year period under analysis, and this change was motivated by exogenous and not 
strategic reasons (NHS Report, 2002).5 Hence, there is little incentive for patients to keep track of prices. 
Lastly, physicians in the UK (as in most Western economies) play an important role in deciding 
under which format, generic or branded, patients will receive a multi-source drug. If a prescription is 
written under the molecule name, the pharmacist can dispense any product containing the molecule; if a 
brand name is prescribed, the pharmacist has to dispense the brand. Because pharmacists have strong 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The brand names in the US are Paxil (Seroxat), Zoloft (Lustral) and Celexa (Cipramil). 
5 The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) regulates the prices that drugs protected by patents receive from the NHS. 
Under the PPRS, companies are obliged to reduce the price of a drug if the financial returns for that drug exceed a certain 
threshold. One of the price reductions observed in the data was indeed imposed by PPRS; the other significant change was due to 
the entry of generics. 
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incentives to dispense generics if they want to remain competitive6, the format choice of a specific 
molecule will be mostly at the hands of the physician. 
4.2 Detailed Data Description 
For each physician we have information on (1) new SSRI and changes of SSRI medication for each 
prescription written, (2) frequency and timing of sales representatives’ visits to physicians from all 
competing drugs in the market, and (3) physician specific information (gender and practice size). The 
identity of the patients is not available. We retained all records in which Prozac (fluoxetine), Seroxat 
(paroxetine), Lustral (sertraline), and Cipramil (citalopram) were prescribed. These are the four key 
players for this category during the two years covered by the data and represent over 98% of all SSRI 
prescriptions. We do not include the remaining (much smaller) drugs in the analysis because of their 
limited impact, although our approach could be easily extended to include them. 
In addition, we analyze only those physicians who remained active in the panel and in the category 
for the entire observation period so that comparisons of their prescription activity before and after generic 
entry could be made.7 Our criteria for including a physician was the writing of at least ten new SSRI 
prescriptions and the receipt of at least three sales calls from any of the four key players in the two-year 
period under analysis. This yielded a subset of 170 physicians. This sample provides an excellent 
representation of the category: it accounts for more than 80% of all SSRI prescriptions in the time period 
under analysis and shows no significant differences with respect to demographic makeup when compared 
to the full panel (similar share of female physicians and similar average practice size). 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of prescriptions and detailing visits per molecule for the 
                                                 
6 Legislation in the UK fosters competition at the retail level. Generally speaking, the NHS calculates an average price for each 
drug in the UK and reimburses the pharmacist according to this price. Therefore, drugstores feel the pressure to be efficient in 
buying, and the cheapest alternatives tend to be generics. A complete description of how this system works is beyond this 
manuscript. For details, shortcomings, and suggested ways of improving the system, read “Fundamental Review of the Generic 
Drugs Market,” a Report prepared by OXERA on behalf of the Department of Health (July 2001). 
7 There are about 400 physicians in the panel, though the numbers vary over the years as some physicians enter the panel while 
others exit. To perform our analysis, however, we kept only those physicians who stayed with the panel during the entire period 
of our analysis (from September 1998 until September 2000). The 188 physicians who exited or entered the panel during this 
time period were not included in the analysis because their prescription activity before and after generic entry cannot be 
compared. From the remaining physicians, we then only considered those active in the category. About 36 physicians were 
excluded because they were the target of either no or too infrequent detailing meetings.  
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final dataset. Period 1 includes the 16 months from September 1998 until December 1999, and Period 2 
includes the 9 months from January 2000 until September 2000. The final dataset comprises the records 
of 170 physicians who wrote a total of 10,079 SSRI prescriptions. Over the entire sample period, SSRIs 
were prescribed about 403 times each month and engaged in 100 detailing visits monthly. There was 
significant heterogeneity both in the number of prescriptions and the number of detailing visits across 
physicians. The minimum number of total prescriptions per physician for Periods 1 and 2 combined was 
11, and the maximum was 236; for the number of detailing visits, the minimum was two and the 
maximum 66. 
Fluoxetine (Prozac) and paroxetine (Seroxat) were the two market leaders, followed by 
citalopram (Cipramil), with sertraline (Lustral) the fourth largest SSRI drug. An important change in 
Period 2 is the slight reduction in prescription share of fluoxetine as a whole (generic plus brand name) 
after generic entry (from 36% to 35%). Aggregate data from the NHS confirm a declining trend (details 
are available from the authors upon request). Though not novel in the literature (e.g., Caves et al., 1992), 
this is a surprising result considering that the average prices of fluoxetine dropped 37% immediately after 
generic entry (during the entire period under analysis, only one other significant price change took place: 
a price decrease of Lustral prior to generic entry).  
One inference from this analysis would be to say that physicians do not consider drug prices in 
their prescribing decisions. However, another explanation is that some physicians were influenced by the 
significant average price cut, whereas others were influenced by the changes in marketing activity that 
took place in this time period across all competitors, including the non-bioequivalent drugs that retained 
patent protection. To see how marketing activity could play a significant role, consider the share of voice 
of the different competitors. In Period 1, all drugs have similar detailing levels (ranging from 22 to 29%). 
Once generics enter the market, detailing shares shift dramatically. In Period 2, Lundbeck increased the 
detailing of citalopram, reaching a share of voice of 34%, while Eli Lilly gradually stopped Prozac 
detailing. Given that generic versions of fluoxetine do not engage in detailing activities, the detailing 
17 
share of fluoxetine dropped to 11% in Period 2. In the last six months of Period 2, fluoxetine’s share of 
voice is even lower, decreasing to 4%. Figure 2 confirms this decreasing pattern of fluoxetine detailing (it 
presents the quarterly detailing activity for Prozac and the remaining SSRI drugs).   
This first analysis is therefore very significant, as it suggests that other forces beyond prices are at 
play after generic entry. It also suggests the importance of analyzing individual physician behavior and 
the competition of non-bioequivalent molecules before and after a patent expires to correctly determine 
the impact of generic entry on market structure. These are important facets of the problem we include in 
our subsequent analysis. 
Next, we describe the variables extracted from the final dataset that were used in the analysis of 
within- and between-molecule competition.  
4.3 Variable Definition for the Random Effects Multinomial Logit Model 
A long stream of literature has demonstrated that detailing visits have a major impact on physician 
prescribing (e.g., Gönül et al., 2001; Wittink, 2002; Venkataraman & Stremersch, 2007). Following 
previous research (e.g., Gönül et al., 2001), we account for the effect of detailing using a parsimonious 
and flexible exponential smoothing formulation that allows detailing meetings to have an impact on 
prescriptions even if they did not occur immediately before a prescription occasion, though this technique 
will give more weight to recent detailing visits. Hence, we define the detailing variable, SDijt, as: 
)(tijijt SDDSD  , for I = 1, …, N, j = 1, …, J, and t = 1, …, Ti, and (2) 




  ijDij DSDD 


1
, (3) 
 
where J is the number of alternative molecules, N is the number of physicians observed, Ti is the number 
of times physician i prescribes in the category, (t) is a function that maps the prescribing occasion t to 
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its corresponding calendar day , D is the parameter of daily decay (0 < D < 1)8, and Dij is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if molecule j is detailed to physician i in calendar day  or the value 
zero otherwise. With this formulation, the mean of the stock of detailing variables was between 0.18 
(Cipramil) and 0.27 (Lustral).  
 Unlike detailing, price effects have been subject to greater controversy. For example, the results 
of Arosson et al. (2001) and Lundin (2000) suggest that physicians consider the price patients effectively 
pay for the drugs when deciding which drug to prescribe. The results of Newhouse (1993) and Gönül et 
al. (2001) suggest that there could be a significant segment of physicians who instead do not care about 
prices. In the specific case of UK prescribing, while patients have little incentive to consider prices (as 
described previously), physicians are likely to consider therapy costs. All GPs in the UK receive a report 
from the Prescription Pricing Authority that provides doctors with a comparison of their total drug 
spending against other practices (these other practices are usually in the same area and have, in general, a 
similar patient profile). This means that physicians are aware of their total drug expenditure and of how it 
compares to the expenditures of similar physicians. In addition, if a GP practice maintains its prescribing 
costs (and other treatment costs) below certain targets, the practice will receive additional funds. These 
funds are a direct function of how far below target the practice costs are. The practice can then use the 
funds to invest in its structure and buy equipment or software connected to its activities. 
These controls and incentives are likely to make physicians price sensitive and more willing to 
prescribe generics, which is one of the most effective ways to keep costs down and maintain therapeutic 
effectiveness. However, previous research studies have not provided a clear answer on whether or not 
physicians consider prescription costs. Hence, because it is yet unclear whether physicians are or are not 
price sensitive, we will measure physician sensitivity to price. 
During the time period under analysis, there was only one significant price change unrelated to 
                                                 
8 In our empirical application, the daily decay parameter of detailing is fixed so that a detailing visit has a half life of 1 month, 
which means that if detailing is one on the day of the visit, it will be about one half 30 days after (D = 0.997). We tested for 
alternative decay values (details presented in the Robustness Checks section).  
 
19 
the entry of generic fluoxetine in the market: a price reduction of 38% for Lustral in June 1999 imposed 
by the government (Department of Health UK, 2002). We account for this price cut by incorporating a 
dummy variable, PDjt, that takes the value of one if j = Lustral and if a prescription occasion takes place 
after Lustral’s price reduction; PDjt will then be zero all other times. (We do not add a second price 
dummy for the price reduction of fluoxetine after generic entry because the data used in the estimation of 
the multinomial logit model include only data from before generic entry.)  
 Finally, another important factor affecting physician prescribing is state-dependence in physician 
choices, which can affect the correct measurement of marketing and price responsiveness (Janakiraman et 
al., 2008). Following previous research, we incorporate information about physicians' past prescriptions 
using a dummy variable, SXijt, that takes the value of one if physician i selects drug j on prescribing 
occasion t-1 and takes the value of zero otherwise (we have tested alternative state dependence 
specifications and found that the lagged dummy provides the best fit; details available from the authors 
upon request). 
The final model formulation can then be written as: 
 3210 ijtjtijijtijijtijijijt PDSXSDV   ,  (4) 
 
where Vijt is the valuation of molecule j for physician i on prescription occasion t (see Appendix A), ijt is 
a general extreme value distributed error term (Train, 2003), and 0ij, 1ij, 2ij and 3ij represent the 
intercepts (baseline preference), the responsiveness to detailing, the effect of past prescriptions, and the 
responsiveness to price, respectively. Finally, all of the parameters are physician- and drug-specific, 
though some constraints are necessary in the multinomial logit model for identification purposes (see 
Appendix A for details on the constraints).  
4.4 Variable Definition for the Binomial Models of Within- and Between-Molecule Competition 
We model within- and between-molecule competition as a function of observable and unobservable 
physician characteristics. For the observable characteristics, we use as covariates physician gender and 
practice size: gender is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the physician is male 
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and zero if female; practice size is defined as the number of physicians working in the physician's 
practice. For the unobservable characteristics, we include as explanatory variables the values of the 
individual-level parameters estimated using the multinomial logit. To reduce noise, we build 85% 
probability intervals for each physician-parameter combination based on 2000 draws from the posterior 
distribution and keep only the mean values significantly different from zero. All others were set to zero. 
We note, however, that all 170 physicians were also used in the second stage estimation (some physicians 
have their parameters set to zero when not significant, but all are included in the estimation). We follow a 
similar approach to that of Allenby and Ginter (1995) and classify physicians as being more or less 
responsive to detailing and pricing using the first stage parameters.9 The parameters of interest that were 
included are responsiveness to Prozac detailing (1i_Prozac) and to Lustral’s price cut (3i). We also 
included the intrinsic attractiveness of Prozac for all the physicians as an indicator of the preference for 
fluoxetine. The other individual level parameters provided little information. 
To prevent confounding responsiveness to detailing and intrinsic physician preference with the 
level of detailing activity and the prescribing levels, we have also included several control variables. 
These include the number of detailing visits from Prozac and its competitors during Periods 1 and 2 and 
the level of physician prescribing of drugs competing with the multisource molecule during Period 1. 
 Next, we discuss in detail the results, highlight the potential explanations for the market evolution, 
and elaborate on the implications for policy makers and drug companies. Finally, we conclude with the 
limitations and areas for future research. 
5. Results 
First, we will briefly discuss the results of the first modeling phase. Then we will discuss in more detail 
the results of the binomial model that uses as covariates the parameters estimates from the first phase.  
                                                 
9 We have also estimated the same models using the type of classification of Allenby and Ginter (1995): we 
classified physicians as either being sensitive to detailing (price) or not sensitive. We then included dummy 
variables that accounted for such classification (the magnitude of sensitivity would then not matter). The results 
from this alternative formulation were extremely similar to the ones we present here, and the conclusions from both 
formulations are exactly the same.  
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 5.1 Random Effects Multinomial Logit Model 
 Table 3 presents the posterior means and 95% probability intervals for the population-level 
estimates of the random effects multinomial logit. Consistent with previous research, we find significant 
state-dependence across physicians' drug choices (the posterior mean of the population-level parameter of 
past prescriptions, 2, is 0.31 with a probability interval of [0.23, 0.38]). Regarding the intercepts, we find 
an overall preference for Prozac (fluoxetine) and Seroxat (paroxetine), a result that is consistent with their 
market shares (36% and 33% respectively). 
We also find that overall, in this market and for this therapeutic category, physicians seem to care 
about prices. The parameter associated with the price cut of Lustral, 3, is significant and positive (the 
expected direction given that we are accounting for a price cut in the model and not the actual prices) with 
a posterior mean of 0.42 and a probability interval of [0.14, 0.62]. Given the lack of specific results in the 
literature regarding physician price sensitivity, we believe this to be an important result. However, we 
note that there is significant heterogeneity across physicians. Looking at the individual level price-cut 
parameters, we can identify a segment of physicians sensitive to price (about 17% of the sample) and 
another segment that seems not to consider price changes (about 83% of the sample).  
 With respect to the response to detailing we note that, consistent with previous research findings, 
detailing seems to significantly and positively affect physician prescribing decisions. The parameter 
associated with Prozac detailing has a posterior mean of 0.29 with a wide 95% probability interval, 
though it does not include zero. The parameters associated with the detailing of the remaining molecules 
are also all significant (i.e., have 95% probability intervals that do not include zero) and positive. In 
addition, and consistent with previous research, we again find considerable heterogeneity across 
physicians, which demonstrates the need for modeling individual physician response and for using 
individual physician data to study physician prescribing (e.g., 19% of the physicians have positive and 
significant individual parameters for Prozac detailing, with posterior mean values that range from 0.29 to 
0.56; the remaining physicians have parameters that were not significant).   
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5.2 Binomial Model Estimations Post Generic Entry 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the binomial regressions of between- and within-molecule 
competition, respectively, estimated after generics have been introduced (what we called Period 2). All 
variables in the binomial models deemed non-significant at a 5% significance level were dropped from 
further analysis, and we only present the parameters estimated for the retained variables. Based on 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) comparisons, the full models are also significant. 
 In these binomial models, we use as covariates the estimates of unobservable characteristics 
obtained from the logit model (these include the sensitivity to detailing and prices). Because such 
estimates have significant measurement error (e.g., the individual-level parameters obtained from the first 
stage of the analysis have wide confidence intervals), we need to assess the robustness of our estimates. 
To do so we use a bootstrap procedure. We re-estimate the binomial models 100 times, including as 
covariates the posterior means of the parameters from the logit model computed using 100 different 
random samples of physician-specific draws (we retained 2000 draws during estimation of the logit model 
for each physician and each sub-sample has 200 draws; re-sampling was performed with replacement). 
We report the parameters of the binomial models (posterior means used as covariates are computed across 
the 2000 draws) and the range of the empirical distribution of the t-statistic for the different replications. 
We also adopted an alternative approach in which the binomial estimates were integrated over all the 
MCMC chain of the first-stage estimation (in the end, a distribution was obtained for the binomial model 
estimates). Both approaches produced the same conclusions, and we will be reporting here the bootstrap 
results (details on the integration approach are available from the authors upon request).  
Physicians Sensitive to Prozac Detailing Decrease their Fluoxetine Prescribing after Generic Entry
 A first significant result from the binomial models is the reduction of fluoxetine prescribing 
(Prozac plus generics) in Period 2 by those physicians sensitive to Prozac detailing in Period 1. The first 
and second columns of Table 4 present the results of Model I (the model of between-molecule 
competition that uses the share of fluoxetine prescribing from Period 1 as its baseline). This model is 
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adequate to explain the changes in prescribing of fluoxetine (Prozac plus generics) versus other SSRIs 
from Period 1 to Period 2. The binomial parameter associated with Prozac detailing is  and 
significant across all replications. This means that those physicians who are more sensitive to Prozac 
detailing are the ones who ‘move away from’ fluoxetine the most (Prozac plus generics) in Period 2 
compared to Period 1. 
 This prescription reduction is significant (Table 6 presents the summary of these effect sizes and 
the division of physicians into different sensitivity groups). Based on physicians’ individual probability 
intervals for the parameter of Prozac detailing, we have classified physicians into those sensitive to 
Prozac detailing (HIGH Group) and those not sensitive (LOW Group). About 14% of the physicians were 
classified as being sensitive (HIGH), and on average, these physicians prescribed just over 7% less 
fluoxetine (Prozac plus generic versions) in Period 2 than would have been expected considering their 
prescribing levels from Period 1. Using a Chi-squared test, we conclude that this is a significant change at 
a 5% significance level. The remaining 86% of physicians classified as LOW (that is, not responsive to 
Prozac detailing) did not exhibit any significant change in their prescription behavior in Period 2 from 
what would have been expected given their prescribing behavior in Period 1 (the average change in 
fluoxetine prescriptions was 1.04% and not significant). 
 The reaction of detail sensitive physicians is perhaps due to the sudden reduction and subsequent 
elimination of Prozac detailing (generics do not engage in marketing activities in this market). Physicians 
who were greatly influenced by marketing activities ended up reducing their fluoxetine prescribing once 
the marketing actions of Prozac stopped, switching to the other SSRIs that maintained (or even increased) 
their promotional efforts. What we observe in our results is that those physicians receiving more detailing 
visits from Prozac’s competitors reduced their prescribing of the Prozac molecule more than the 
remaining physicians. This means that predictions of the impact of generics impact must also consider the 
marketing reactions of the existing brands that still retain patent protection (i.e., non-bioequivalent 
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competitors still under patent protection), not just the direct effects of generics on the brand losing patent 
protection.  
 With respect to the cross-sectional variation of prescribing in Period 2, we note that 
responsiveness to Prozac detailing does not explain the physician prescribing split into fluoxetine and 
other drugs across all physicians (the variable is not significant in Model II; see Table 4), though it 
explains the prescribing of Prozac versus generic versions of fluoxetine once fluoxetine is the prescribed 
molecule. Physicians responsive to Prozac detailing in Period 1 prescribed generics fewer times, given 
that the fluoxetine molecule was chosen (the variable has a negative impact, ResponseProzacDetailing 
and is significant in Model IV, the within-molecule model without baseline; see Table 5).  
This is an interesting result from a public policy point of view. Though physicians sensitive to 
Prozac detailing (all else constant) do not prescribe the molecule fluoxetine differently from those not 
responsive (only the changes from Period 1 to Period 2 at the individual level are affected), once the 
molecule was chosen, physicians tended to prescribe fewer generics if they were sensitive to Prozac 
detailing. In this case, detailing seems to have had a long lasting effect on the market even after it was no 
longer used by the company: in other words, it created loyalty to the brand. This result would not have 
been discovered had we used traditional regression-based techniques using aggregate level data. 
Price Sensitive Physicians Increase Fluoxetine Prescribing Physicians who reacted positively to the 
price cut of Lustral in Period 1 switched from other SSRI molecules to fluoxetine in Period 2 
(ResponsePriceCut in Model I). This pattern is simple to explain: price sensitive physicians see a greater 
advantage in using fluoxetine versus all other drugs in the category because of its reduced price after 
generic entry. These physicians will then prescribe more fluoxetine than before and reduce the use of the 
remaining molecules (switch from other SSRIs to fluoxetine).  
 Again, the prescription changes are significant (see Table 6 for a summary of the results). For 
example, physicians classified as LOW with respect to the price cut parameter (about 83% of the sample) 
reduced their fluoxetine prescriptions by 3.83%; those classified as HIGH (about 17%) increased the use 
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of fluoxetine by 7.80%, more than would have been expected given their prescribing in Period 1. Both 
changes are statistically significant. However, the increase in fluoxetine prescribing (a result desired from 
a public policy perspective after generic entry) was not able to compensate for the reduction of fluoxetine 
prescriptions from other physicians who are not especially price conscious and might be sensitive to other 
marketing actions, such as detailing.  
Observable Physician Characteristics can help to predict Generic Use        Consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Hellerstein 1998), we find that observable physician characteristics can explain part of the 
variance of format choice decisions. The results in Table 5 (models of within-molecule competition) 
provide clear evidence that though there is a total increase in generic prescribing, male doctors and those 
working in smaller practices are less proactive in increasing these levels (Gender and 
PracticeSize in Model III). In addition, all else constant, we find that physicians in smaller practices 
and male physicians prescribe fewer generics than the remaining physicians in Period 2, when fluoxetine 
is the chosen molecule (Gender and PracticeSize in Model IV). However, it is not clear why 
we obtain such a result. One possible explanation, for example, is that smaller practices are not as well 
informed about the potential cost benefits of generic prescribing. Another possible explanation for the 
practice size result is that current incentives are designed to benefit mostly bigger practices. It is difficult 
to find explanations for why male physicians prescribe fewer generics. It is possible that gender is 
working as a proxy for some other factor we are not accounting for and that further research is required to 
fully understand this result. Such understanding will be important if the UK government is to increase 
generic prescribing.  
5.3 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our model results, we have estimated alternative model formulations. 
Below we report on the results of these additional tests. 
Multinomial Logit Model Re-Estimated with Alternative Parameter Constraints We re-estimated the 
multinomial logit model using different values for the detailing decay parameter and also tested whether 
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the detailing parameters should be constrained to be the same for all drugs in the market. The results from 
these additional models reveal that for alternative values of the decay parameter that lead to half lives 
between 15 and 45 days, our final results do not change. These are values consistent with previous 
research. As for using a common detailing parameter, we find that detailing parameters should be 
different across brands. Hence, and unlike price (which is easily compared across brands), detailing 
activity seems to be intrinsically different across firms. Detailing is about content and is often not 
equivalent across brands or pharmaceutical firms, as each firm will discuss their own drugs.  
Binomial Models Re-Estimated to Check the Role of Outlier Physicians and Time-Frames Used To 
investigate the role of outliers in the second-phase estimation, we re-estimated the binomial models (1) 
using alternative significance cutoffs for the individual-level parameters, (2) after separating physicians 
into high- versus low-volume prescribing (we use a median split of the molecule prescriptions by 
physician), and (3) after removing the top and bottom physicians with respect to their sensitivity to price 
and detailing. In addition, to test for the effect of using alternative time-frames, we re-estimate the 
binomial models using the prescription data from April 2000 until September 2000, leaving out the first 
three months after generic entry to allow for a settling-down period. In this new binomial model 
estimation, we use as covariates the same individual-level parameters from the previously estimated 
multinomial logit. 
Our results show that the existence of a subset of price sensitive physicians is consistently found 
under all specifications and that the results associated with the price sensitive physicians are not driven by 
single individuals (i.e., physicians who reacted positively to the price cut of Lustral increased the 
prescription of fluoxetine once the generic was introduced in all specifications). The size of this segment 
is also consistently small and unable to overcome the overall decreasing pattern in the behavior of the 
detailing-sensitive physicians of the sample.  
We also find significant support for the effect of the detailing-sensitive segment across most of 
these additional analyses. The effect of detailing lacked statistical significance among only low 
prescribing physicians (who correspond to a very small percentage of overall prescriptions). One possible 
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explanation for this effect is that it is more difficult to identify detailing effects among physicians who 
prescribe little. The same result was obtained for competitive detailing effects (i.e., the result that 
physicians who receive more detailing visits from other drugs’ representatives in the second stage will 
reduce fluoxetine prescribing to a greater degree). We find that results are also very consistent across all 
the models tested, except when the measurement error is higher (i.e., among low prescribing physicians). 
Multinomial Logit Model and Binomial Models Re-Estimated Using a Nested Structure   As one last 
check, we model the physician decision of drug choice for each patient visit given a prescription in the 
focal therapeutic category as a two-level process: physicians select which molecule to prescribe given a 
prescription in the category (e.g., fluoxetine versus citalopram, given an SSRI prescription) and then 
which version (e.g., branded versus generic). This modeling approach creates a two-level tree structure 
(Figure 3) that can be estimated using the well-known multinomial nested logit model. We estimate a 
random effects multinomial nested logit using data from September 1998 until March 2000 (i.e., 
including three months after generic entry). Also in this alternative formulation, we estimate individual 
level parameters (underlying preferences, responsiveness to marketing activity and prices, and the 
inclusive value parameter of the nested structure) via a random effects formulation and use these to 
characterize physicians. The model is estimated using Bayesian simulation methods (details available 
from the authors upon request). 10 
Based on the results of this new multinomial logit, we re-estimated the second-phase binomial 
models using data from April 2000 until September 2000 and the individual-level parameters estimated 
using the nested logit. Our results reveal exactly the same patterns as identified previously: a group of 
price sensitive physicians increase their prescription of fluoxetine, but detailing-sensitive physicians 
                                                 
10 The nested structure is essential when analyzing time periods in which generic and branded versions of the same molecule co-
exist in the market. The nested structure avoids the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property (IIA), which is present in 
standard multinomial logit models. We note that government agencies evaluate and approve the bioequivalence of generic drugs, 
and though controversy persists about the bioequivalence of a handful of medications, nearly all other generic drugs provide 
identical therapeutic benefits (Fischer & Avorn, 2003). Hence, generic and branded versions of the same molecule are more 
similar to each other than to other non-bioequivalent molecules that can be used to treat the same illness, which violates the IIA 
property of standard multinomial logit models (see Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). On the other hand, we cannot model generics 
and branded alternatives of a molecule as if they are exactly the same in the eyes of physicians. Physicians are not always 
indifferent between the two because generics do not benefit from previous investments in goodwill (e.g., advertising) and from 
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switch to other branded non-bioequivalent molecules (the brands that sustain or increase their detailing 
activity). Hence, our results are again robust to alternative model specification. 
Finally, we estimated the Multinomial Nested Logit model using the complete dataset (from 
September 1998 until September 2000), and we allowed for interactions in the model intercepts, detailing, 
and price effects. Our objective was to determine whether the second stage results had been driven by 
changes in detailing and price responsiveness. Our results revealed that there was no significant change in 
physician response after generic entry. The only change detected was the change we explained via our 
binomial models: an overall increase in preference for Cipramil and a decrease in preference for Prozac.  
In sum, the many alternative model specifications estimated support our original findings. 
Overall, our analysis demonstrates the robustness of our results. 
6. Conclusions 
The Unit of Analysis 
Patent expiration represents a turning point for the brand losing patent protection, as generic versions of 
the drug, certified as bioequivalent, quickly enter the market at reduced prices. Consequently, for some 
managers of branded drugs, this entry changes market dynamics and could be a threat, while it could 
provide an opportunity for others. For public health officials, it also represents an opportunity to reduce 
healthcare costs without jeopardizing therapeutic effectiveness. In studying what factors might influence 
the adoption of generic drugs and provide an opportunity for cost reduction from new generic entry, 
previous research has focused mostly on how generics impact prices and market shares of the drug losing 
patent protection (within-molecule competition). In this paper, we demonstrate that if managers and 
public officials want to get a more comprehensive picture of the impact of generic entry, they need to 
look beyond within-molecule competition. In particular, we suggest that they need to study the full 
competitive landscape in the relevant therapeutic class, including the actions of non-bioequivalent 
competitors. In addition, managers and policy makers need to consider carefully the role of individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
years of market presence and experience as do branded versions. Physicians can then see generics as a trade-off between cost and 
(perceived) quality (see Caves et al., 1992). These differences can be accounted for in a nested logit model. 
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physicians and their prescribing behavior across all competing molecules and study their reactions not 
only to prices but also to marketing activity.  
 To provide support for this contention, we studied the evolution of Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors (SSRI) in the UK after generic versions of fluoxetine (brand name Prozac) were introduced. 
Using a data set on physician prescribing and competitive marketing activity, we investigated how the 
prescribing decisions of physicians and their characteristics (observable and unobservable) impact the 
competition among all molecules after generic entry. We found that the market share of the molecule 
losing patent protection (fluoxetine) decreased slightly after patent expiration, despite the availability of 
generics at significant price discounts. Our approach allows us to offer new insight to managers about the 
change in market share of fluoxetine. We suggest that the reduction occurred because a segment of 
physicians prescribed less of the multi-source molecule and more of other drugs in the category after 
generic entry (between-molecule effect). These were physicians sensitive to the marketing activities of 
Prozac who then reacted to the significant reduction of Prozac’s marketing investment after generic entry. 
We also find that a segment of price sensitive physicians did increase prescribing of fluoxetine due to its 
lower average price, but this increase was unable to compensate for the reduction of fluoxetine 
prescribing by physicians sensitive to marketing activities.  
Managerial Implications 
The market evolution we have documented and explained presents important opportunities for 
managers of the non-bioequivalent branded drugs. Our findings suggest that introduction of generics 
could present an opportunity for managers of competing brands that are still under patent protection. For 
example, when the US appeals court in Washington D.C. set a sooner-than-expected end to Prozac’s 
patent protection in the US, analysts warned that the sales of one of Prozac’s most important competitors, 
Cipramil (also known in the US as Celexa), could be damaged by competition from generic versions of 
Prozac. Our results might explain why Celexa managers were not disturbed by such predictions 
(McCarthy, 2000): perhaps Celexa managers anticipated a reduction of Prozac marketing efforts and an 
increase in prescribing of their own molecule by a significant number of physicians given the 
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responsiveness profile of those physicians. Indeed, this article shows that it is essential to study 
physicians’ choice behavior and their responsiveness to price and detailing to fully understand and better 
predict the market events following generic entry in a therapeutic class. 
We also show an approach that managers could use to simulate outcomes of both generic entry and 
incumbent responses to assess resource allocation decisions post generic entry. In addition, we provide a 
rationale for one manufacturer to market more than one drug in the same category with different patent 
protection timescales (which could be achieved through acquisition or in-licensing). When one of the 
patents expires, the manufacturer could switch marketing support to other brands still under patent 
protection. There is a parallel here to the way that manufacturers of fast moving consumer goods market 
such products as detergents, offering multiple brands within the category and using one or more of the 
brands to protect the market position of the portfolio. 
Even if very detailed information is not available for all the physicians, companies and 
governments could determine which physicians to target using observable physician characteristics. In 
this data set, for example, women prescribe generics more often than men, and physicians working in 
larger practices prescribe more generics than those in smaller practices. 
Policy Implications 
Health care costs and the quality of patient care are two of the most prominent concerns of public health 
officials today. Because physicians’ prescribing behavior has a direct impact on both costs and care 
quality, governments that subsidize pharmaceutical expenditures are increasingly interested in 
understanding physicians’ decision processes and in influencing their choices. One of the avenues 
pursued by public health officials to reduce health-related expenditures while minimizing the impact on 
therapeutic effectiveness has been to foster the substitution of branded molecules with lower priced 
bioequivalent generic versions. Previous research has demonstrated this to be a viable approach, 
documenting the significant savings governments achieve (e.g., Fischer & Avorn, 2003) and the fast 
takeover of generics soon after their entry (e.g., Grabowski & Vernon, 1996).  
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It is without doubt that, in most therapeutic categories, physician substitution of branded versions 
with their generic alternatives can provide, on its own, significant savings with minimum therapeutic 
impact. As a result, most of the analyses and studies on generic entry have focused on this within-
molecule competition and on generic substitution. However, a decrease in the number of prescriptions of 
the multi-source molecule as a whole (branded + generic) due to switching to non-bioequivalent branded 
alternatives after generic entry could significantly reduce the savings potential and undermine government 
objectives.11 Though governments and policy researchers worry about the share of generic prescribing 
when the multi-source molecule is chosen by physicians, in previous analyses policy officials and 
researchers seem to have overlooked the possible substitution that can take place across non-
bioequivalent molecules. As the promotional investment in the multi-source molecule is reduced or even 
eliminated, non-bioequivalent branded molecules used to treat the same conditions (still under patent 
protection and significantly more expensive) can gain visibility and market share. It is as if policy makers 
focus on the percentage of two similar liquids in one bucket but forget to prevent or minimize the leak to 
a different (and more costly) bucket.  
Hence, from a public policy perspective, patterns similar to those observed in the UK SSRI 
category are an undesirable evolution for governments interested in optimizing their prescription 
expenses. We note that UK prescription guidelines (in the UK, the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, NICE, is in charge of producing clinical guidelines to inform physicians on the best 
therapeutic choices) recommend that physicians prescribe SSRIs without specifying which one 
(Middleton et al., 2005). Most SSRIs in the market (including the ones analyzed here) have very similar 
side effect profiles and work in very similar ways (Currie & Park, 2002; Anderson et al., 2000). Hence, 
                                                 
11 Major depression is estimated as the fourth leading specific cause of disability on a global scale and second only to heart 
disease in developed countries (Murray & Lopez, 1997); as a result, considering the size of the antidepressant market, a reduction 
of just one share point can represent significant shifts in drug expenditures. 
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from the perspective of the payers, there are good reasons for wanting a higher share of the generic SSRI, 
given its cost advantage.12 
Hence, we believe that it is worth the effort for a government that is actively subsidizing 
pharmaceutical expenditures to study the costs and benefits of a marketing program for newly introduced 
generics. Detailing is just one possible tool in such a program, and it has been used previously in a similar 
context (some states in the US already engage in counter-detailing activities and organize visits of sales 
representatives promoting the generic versions of molecules; Mizik and Jacobson, 2004). The tools 
available to policy makers also include incentives directed to physicians. Indeed, our results seem to 
indicate that the incentives designed by the UK government to control prescribing expenses and promote 
generic prescribing might be working, at least in part (our findings reveal that a segment of physicians do 
care about prices). However, our results also reveal that these incentives might not be working for all 
physicians. Physicians in smaller practices, for example, seem to be less sensitive to therapy cost. This 
implies that different incentives might be appropriate in order to engage smaller practices.  
Finally, we believe that the policy tools available to governments deserve a more systematic and 
empirical analysis so that stronger conclusions can be drawn (these might favor government-led 
investments in promotions of generics, though our study does not provide a definitive conclusion). We 
also believe that to design proper incentive schemes, governments should study both within- and 
between-molecule dynamics, the likely competitive responses of all players in the market, the 
responsiveness of physicians to prices and to marketing activity, and the sizes of the different physician 
segments. For example, to impose the substitution of branded versions with their generic alternatives at 
the level of pharmacies might not produce the expected and desired cost reductions if physicians switch to 
other branded molecules of the same category that are still under patent protection and supported by 
strong promotional budgets.  
                                                 
12 Though care should be taken in considering dosage adjustments, such adjustments are already required when switching from 
Prozac to generic fluoxetine. We note that certifying bodies allow some degree of variation in terms of drug potency when 
determining drug bioequivalence. Physicians need to consider these differences and adjust dosages accordingly (Moran, 2007). 
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We must also emphasize that we do not want to imply any stark changes in policies from the 
analysis of just one category. Our main goal is to show how inter-molecule competition and physician 
characteristics play a significant role in the evolution and use of drugs that have recently lost patent 
protection, even if such issues have remained mostly unstudied. However, we note that the UK SSRI 
market share patterns are not uncommon (see, for example, Caves et al., 1992), and hence we would 
expect our findings to have broader applicability. In Figure 4 we present the UK market share figures for 
three additional molecules that recently lost patent protection. These molecules are Nizatidine (commonly 
used in the treatment of peptic ulcer and gastroesophageal reflux disease) and Enalapril Maleate and 
Lisinopril (two ACE inhibitors that treat high blood pressure). As we can see from the Figure, the three 
molecules show similar market evolution to that of fluoxetine and warrant further investigation. 
Limitations of the Research Setting and Suggestions for Future Research  
The analyses in this paper were based solely on UK data for the SSRI category because this was the only 
dataset available with the level of detail required to answer our research question (our analyses require the 
use of individual level physician data covering a significant period of time and including information on 
drug choice for each patient visit and on the marketing activity targeted to physicians). Datasets with such 
detail are not common for a multitude of categories and countries. Previous research indicates that 
institutional features of each market have a large influence on prescribing behavior and on the effects of 
generic entry. In addition, each pharmaceutical category might reveal different market evolutions and 
dynamics (e.g., Danzon & Chao, 2000). As a result, it might be difficult to extrapolate our results to other 
countries and drugs. 
However, given the importance of side effects in the use of SSRIs, we believe this empirical 
example is conservative regarding the impact of price and detailing changes, which is likely bigger in 
contexts where drugs have fewer and less severe side effects. We also believe that the impact of detailing 
in this empirical application is particularly small because of the age of the drugs and the experience of 
physicians. We would expect that physicians starting their professional careers and those considering the 
adoption of new drugs would be more influenced by the informative role of detailing (Narayanan et al., 
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2005). In addition, we would also expect price effects to be more important in those countries or 
situations in which final consumers are more price sensitive (e.g., countries in which final consumers bear 
a greater share of the cost). 
An area for future research would be the replication of our approach for different countries and 
across multiple categories. It would then be possible to understand how institutional features of each 
market interact with physician segmentation and competitive dynamics. Specifically, it would be very 
interesting to establish which kinds of incentives drive physicians to be more price-conscious and which 
drive physicians away from generic prescribing. Further analysis of these issues is warranted to articulate 
more effective policies that can significantly reduce healthcare expenditures with minimum negative 
impact on patient welfare.  
Separating the behavior of physicians when prescribing to new or continuing patients, though 
outside the scope of the current paper, could also provide additional insights on how switching to generics 
or to competitive non-bioequivalent alternatives occurs in the market. Finally, we note that the modeling 
approach employed in this study did not account for the potential non-randomness and endogeneity in the 
marketing decisions (e.g., Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta 2004) and the forward-looking behavior of 
firms in their detailing and price setting decisions (see Dong, Manchanda, & Chintagunta 2005 and Liu, 
Gupta, & Venkataraman 2007 for examples of such models). As a result, our first-stage model estimates 
might include biases. Future work could then develop a supply side model of firm behavior and consider 
how the strategic actions of the different competitors could help predict the market evolution after generic 
entry and assess the impact of endogeneity and non-randomness on the second stage estimation.  
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 Multinomial Logit Model: Define Vijt as physician i’s valuation of drug j for patient visit t as:  
ijtijijtijt XV   , for i = 1, …, N, j = 1, …, J, and t = 1, …, Ti, (A.1)
where Xijt is a (1×k) vector of explanatory variables, ij is the corresponding (k×1) vector of physician 
specific parameters, J is the number of alternative drugs, N is the number of physicians observed, Ti is the 
number of prescription occasions of physician i, and ijt is a general extreme value distributed error term 
(Train 2003).  
 If we assume that physicians prescribe the drug with the maximum valuation, we obtain a 
multinomial logit model. Physician i’s probability of prescribing molecule j on occasion t is then defined 
as:  
 

 J
l
ililt
ijijt
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exp
exp


, 
(A.2)
 We adopted a random effects formulation to model physician-specific effects and estimated the 
final model via Bayesian simulation methods (estimation details presented in Appendix B). Random 
effects are commonly used in economics and management to account for differences across individual 
units. Previous models of pharmaceutical demand have also used a random effects formulation to account 
for heterogeneity (e.g., Manchanda et al 2004; Narayanan et al., 2005). Specifically, we assume that 
physician-specific parameters are normally distributed, ),(   MVNij , where  is the (k×1) vector 
of population level means and  is the corresponding (k× k) variance-covariance matrix. 
 Finally, all of the parameters are physician- and drug-specific, though some constraints are 
necessary for identification purposes. Physician-specific intercepts for Seroxat (Paroxetine) are set to zero 
for each physician. Because we are doing an individual level analysis, we are also interested in reducing 
the number of parameters to a minimum. After several tests, we have further constrained past prescription 
parameters to be equal across all drugs (2ij = 2i , for all j and for all physicians). This final specification 
requires the estimation of only 9 parameters for each of the 170 physicians and is very similar to the 
unconstrained version in terms of fit (details available from the authors upon request).  
 These parameters are estimated using traditional Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, 
with a Gibbs-Sampler to draw from the closed-form conditional distributions and a Metropolis-Hastings 
step to explore the posterior distribution of the parameters without closed form conditionals (Appendix B 
presents the detailed description of priors and estimation procedure). 
 
A.2 Binomial Models: Define pj as physician i'’s probability of prescribing the option u1 in Period 2 
across all prescription occasions. The likelihood for each physician is then given by:  
      iii rniriiii
i
iii pprnr
nprnl  1!!
!
,, , (A.5)
where ri is the number of prescriptions of option u1 for physician i during Period 2, ni is the number of 
prescription occasions, and pi is the probability of prescribing u1. The proposed models (see Table 1 in the 
paper for the different alternatives) are estimated via maximum likelihood. Variables are tested for 
inclusion using a 5% significance level and if deemed non-significant are removed from the final model.  
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APPENDIX B 
B.1 Specification of Priors. 
 
We specify a multivariate normal prior for the between-physician conditional mean parameters and an 
inverted Wishart for the variance-covariance matrix of the random coefficient logit model. We take 
diffuse priors to induce a mild amount of shrinkage. We did a robustness check estimating the models 
with three different priors. Some of the physicians were classified in different groups with the different 
prior specifications, but agreement rate was above 93%; findings were also the same regardless of the 
prior used.  
 The likelihood for physician i with the proposed random coefficient logit model has the following 
form: 
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with the probabilities defined in Equations A.3 and A.4 and yt defined as a dummy variable equal to one 
when drug j in generic/brand version was chosen by physician i on prescription occasion t. Heterogeneity 
is introduced in the model  as ),(   MVNi , and we use the following priors: 
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B.2 Full conditionals and simulation algorithm. 
 
(1) Set starting values for the unknown parameters. 
 
(2) Draw i from a Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. Let us call ip  the previous draw for i  and 
i
n  the candidate draw. The acceptance probability of the candidate draw is given by:  
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(3) Draw   from the conditional distribution: 
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(4) Draw   from the conditional distribution: 
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Figure 1: Evolution of total quarterly SSRI prescriptions (generic entry occurred in January 2000) 
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Figure 2: Evolution of quarterly detailing activity for Prozac and the remaining SSRI drugs 
(generic entry occurred in January 2000) 
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Figure 3: Choice tree of multi-source drugs 
   
 
 
Figure 4: Market Share Evolution for Molecules Before and After Patent Expiration 
(UK Market) 
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Table 1: The Four Binomial Models Estimated 
 With Baseline 
Analyze Prescription Change 
With No Baseline 
Analyze Prescription Split 
Between-Molecule Competition 
Model the number of times the multi-source 
molecule (e.g.,  branded fluoxetine and 
generic fluoxetine) has been prescribed 
across all prescriptions in the category (e.g., 
SSRIs) 
Model I 
  iiIi SHARESHAREs  1log  
SHARE = share of multi-source 
molecule prescriptions (fluoxetine) 
across all prescriptions in the category  
Model II  
 
II
is = 0 
Within-Molecule Competition 
Model the number of times the generic 
version of the multi-source molecule (e.g.,  
generic fluoxetine) has been prescribed 
across all prescriptions of fluoxetine (e.g., 
branded fluoxetine and generic fluoxetine) 
Model III 
  iiIIIi SHARESHAREs  1log
SHARE = Share of generic prescriptions 
of the multi-source molecule across all 
multi-source molecule prescriptions 
Model IV 
 
 
IV
is = 0 
 
43 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Prescriptions and Detailing Visits for our Sample*  
Monthly Prescriptions By  All 170 Physicians Monthly Detailing To All 170 Physicians 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
  
Molecule 
(Brand Name) Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 
Fluoxetine 
(Prozac) 
151 149 36% 35% 28 9 27% 11% 
Paroxetine 
(Seroxat) 
146 131 35% 31% 23 21 22% 26% 
Citalopram 
(Cipramil) 
81 102 19% 24% 22 27 21% 34% 
Sertraline 
(Lustral) 
40 42 10% 10% 29 23 28% 29% 
Total 418 424 100% 100% 103 80 100% 100% 
* Cipramil is the brand name of citalopram, produced by Lundbeck; Lustral is the brand name of sertraline, produced 
by Pfizer; Prozac is the brand name of fluoxetine, produced by Eli-Lily; and Seroxat is the brand name of paroxetine, 
produced by GSK. For fluoxetine, Period 2 prescription values include the prescriptions of branded and generic 
alternatives.  
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Table 3: Random Effects Multinomial Logit 
(Posterior Means and 95% Probability Intervals)*  
  Posterior Mean 95% Probability Intervals 
Intercepts (0)    
       Prozac+Fluoxetine 0.03 [–0.14, 0.20] 
       Lustral –2.05 [–2.45, –1.74] 
       Cipramil –1.46 [–1.83, –1.10] 
Detailing (1)   
   Prozac 0.29 [0.07, 0.50] 
   Lustral 0.55 [0.22, 0.82] 
   Cipramil 0.94 [0.67, 1.22] 
   Seroxat 0.52 [0.35, 0.75] 
Past Prescription (2) 0.31 [0.23, 0.38] 
Price Dummy Lustral (3) 0.42 [0.14, 0.62] 
*Values in bold mean the 95% probability interval for the parameter does not include zero. 
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Table 4: Summary of Results for the Binomial Models of Between-Molecule Competition* 
  
Model I: With Baseline  
(Analyze Change) 
  ii SHARESHAREIis  1log  
Model II : With No Baseline 
(Analyze Levels) 
II
is = 0 
  Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic* 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic* 
Intercept –0.137 0.048 [–4.10, –1.65] (91) –0.728 0.037 –19.569 
Observable Characteristics       
     Gender n.s. n.s.  — n.s. n.s.  — 
     Practice Size –0.104 0.021 [–5.23, –4.70] –0.091 0.019 –4.694 
Unobservable Characteristics       
     Response to Prozac Detailing –0.476 0.195 [–3.18, –2.1] n.s. n.s.  — 
     Response to Price Cut  0.622 0.149 [3.46, 4.68] n.s. n.s.  — 
     Preference for Prozac  n.s n.s   0.760 0.048 15.796 
Control Variables        
     # Prescriptions Period 1 0.004 0.001 [3.24, 2.83] n.s. n.s.  — 
     # Details Period1 0.034 0.009 [4.31, 3.19] n.s. n.s. —  
     # Details Period2 –0.074 0.025 [–3.27, –2.05] –0.043 0.011 –3.944 
Model BIC 1,017.6     NA     
Null Model** BIC 1,122.2     NA     
* Range of the t-statistic for the 100 replications of the posterior mean of the Unobservable Characteristics. In 
parenthesis, number of times that |t-stat|>1.96 (i.e., 95% significant cut-off point). 
** Null Model is a binomial model in which we allow physicians to change their prescriptions by a constant. 
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Table 5: Summary of Results for the Binomial Models of Within-Molecule Competition*  
  
Model III: With Baseline  
(Analyze Change) 
  ii SHARESHAREIIIis  1log  
Model IV : With No Baseline 
(Analyze Levels) 
IV
is = 0 
  
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic* Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic* 
Intercept 2.507 0.299 8.381 2.101 0.173 [10.01, 14.77] 
Observable Characteristics       
     Gender –1.469 0.325 –4.515 –0.945 0.195 [–5.05, –3.97] 
     Practice Size 0.178 0.059 3.017 0.169 0.037 [3.15 4.88] 
Unobservable Characteristics       
     Response to Prozac Detailing  n.s. n.s.   –0.831 0.374 [–4.22, –1.77] (88) 
     Response to Price Cut  n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
     Preference Prozac (0_Prozac) n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
Control Variables        
     # Prescriptions Period 1 n.s. n.s.   0.012 0.003 [3.50, 4.9] 
     # Details Period1 n.s. n.s.   0.029 0.011 [1.70, 2.76] (67) 
     # Details Period2 n.s. n.s.   n.s. n.s.  
Model BIC 412.46    NA    
Null Model** BIC 467.87    NA    
* Range of the t-statistic for the 100 replications of the posterior mean of the Unobservable Characteristics. In 
parenthesis, number of times when |t-stat|>1.96 (i.e., 95% significant cut-off point). 
** Null Model is a binomial model in which we allow physicians to change their prescriptions by a constant.  
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Table 6: Fluoxetine Prescriptions Before and After Generic Entry For Different Physician Groups*  
Physicians Classified as Highly 
Responsive 
Physicians Classified as Less or Not 
Responsive   
With 
respect to 
Percentage of 
Physicians 
Percentage Change in 
Fluoxetine Prescribing 
Percentage of 
Physicians 
Percentage Change 
in Fluoxetine 
Prescribing 
Prozac 
Detailing 14 –7.33
** 86 –1.04 
Price Cut 17 7.80** 83 –3.83** 
* Negative changes mean a decrease of fluoxetine prescribing (Generic + Prozac) after generic entry; 
** Changes are statistically significant at 5% significance level  
 
 
 
 
 
